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Abstract
In this paper we apply a special class ofn-person non-cooperative games, which we call Weakly Coupled
Constrained Games (WCCG), in Home eNodeB (HeNB) systems to manage the aggregated interference they may
generate at Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) NodeB (eNB) associated users. WCCG have the
following structure: the utility of a player depends only onits own assignment and interactions between players appear
through extra constraints. These games have infinitely manyequilibria, we focus on selecting one, the normalized
Nash equilibrium, which has some desirable scalable properties elated to pricing, establish its uniqueness and
compute it in a close form.
I. INTRODUCTION
Femtocells or Home eNodeBs (HeNBs) following the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) nomenclature,
are small-coverage cellular Base Stations (BSs) to be deploy d by end users to provide or improve indoor coverage in
small homes or offices and improve the users capacity [1]. HeNBs have two important configuration characteristics
i.e., users access privileges: closed, open and hybrid access and frequency of operation: dedicated band or co-
channel operation. In terms of users access privileges, cloed HeNBs only can be accessed by those users who
belong to its Closed Subscriber Group (CSG). Open HeNBs can give service to any mobile in the network as long
as they have available resources. Finally, hybrid HeNBs canbe accessed by CSG members as well as non-CSG
members. In terms of frequency of operation, HeNBs can work in a dedicated band, which avoids the interference
with the Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) NodeB (eNB) system, but goes against the current
Cognitive Radio (CR) frequency efficiency trends. On the other hand, HeNBs can perform in co-channel operation,
which allows a higher frequency efficiency but introduces a potential aggregated interference problem in the eNB
system [2].
HeNBs can be considered as low interfering systems since their required transmission power is low due to
their small communication distances and also because of theisolation properties of walls. Anyhow, when dense
urban deployment models are considered, for the case of closed access and co-channel based HeNBs, aggregated
interference problem has to be considered i.e., multiple HeNBs simultaneously transmitting could cause harmful
interference to potentially close eNB users.
In this paper we consider a situation in which multiple HeNBscoexist with eNB, both systems based on Long
Term Evolution (LTE). We assume HeNBs working in co-channeloperation and with closed access privileges,
which is the most complex situation in terms of intercell interference. We assume that interference at eNB users
coming from other eNBs is negligible, due to the considered 3-cell frequency reuse cluster deployment, as well as
the one at HeNB originated from eNBs and neighboring HeNBs, due to the wall penetration losses. We then focuss
on fulfilling two restrictions, the first one common to the multiple HeNBs regarding the amount of interference
they generate at the eNB users and the second a local one regarding the HeNB’s total transmitted power. We
model the given problem as a non-cooperativen-person game, where players are the multiple HeNBs facing an
optimization problem with restrictions. Each playeri in the game is characterized by a set of strategiesSi and
an utility function. Depending on the relation between thistwo parameters and other players’ strategies,n-person
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games can be classified in three models, orthogonal, coupledand generalized.n-person games with orthogonal
constraints, describe those situations where agent’s restrictions are independent of other players’ strategies. The
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium point in these games was proved by Nash in [3]. Coupled constraints
games, are those games where players share a common restriction, therefore the utility and strategies of each player
may depend on the strategies of other players. Finally, for the case of generalized constraints, all players do not
necessarily share common constraints.
Given the above description of the type ofn-person games, we focus on coupled constraint games since our
players aim to maximize their individual utility, subject to a common global constraint, the total interference at
eNB users. We follow the Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (GNEP) natural extension of the standard Nash
equilibrium concept proposed by Nash to players sharing comm n resources or limitations [4]. GNEP is currently
widely used in multiple and different fields such as mathematics, economics, engineering, telecommunications,
computer science, etc. since it perfectly describes competition situations in distributed decision making systems.
Some routing games with capacity constraints have this structure, where the setSi of available strategies to player
i are those for which the sum of flows in each link cannot exceed th link’s capacity. On the other hand, it is an
extension of the constrained satisfaction games recently itroduced by Perlaza et al [5]. GNEP solution concept
in n-person non-cooperative games with common constraints gives infinitely many solutions. In order to select a
unique equilibrium point among solutions in the game, we follow the approach proposed by Rosen in [6], which
is known as normalized equilibrium, since it has suitable prope ties for decentralized scenarios.
In particular, we model our problem as a special subclass of the normalized equilibrium for non-cooperative game
with coupled constraints, which we call Weakly Coupled Constrained Games (WCCG). Here the set of strategies
Si available to a playeri depends on the strategies used by the other players in the gam. This dependency appears
in the common constraint to the agents but not in the players’utility function. We seek for a GNEPs = (s1, ..., sn)
wheresi ∈ Si for each playeri and where no player has any motivation to change its own strategy unilaterally
to another one within the setSi. Here, the WCCG is achieved when every HeNB realizes that, given the current
strategy of the other players, any change in its own strategyto another one that satisfies the constraints would result
in a decrease in the utility. We show for WCCG that if the utility function of each player is strictly concave in the
strategies of that player, then the normalized Nash equilibri m is unique.
We propose players to be able to choose among different stricly concave utility functions, all depending on the
same strategy setSi. Players select the utility they want to maximize accordingto the metric they aim to optimize
i.e., throughput, Bit Error Rate (BER), packet delay. This introduces an interesting flexibility in the game, since
players only have to fulfil the required common constraint independently of the parameter they are optimizing.
In the next section we begin with a motivating example. We then recall in Section III the WCCG equilibrium
as a concept that allows a scalable equilibrium selection, and show its uniqueness for coupled constrain games. In
Section IV we then compute the WCCG equilibrium for the examples we gave in Section III-B.
II. SCENARIO
An Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) downlink is considered, where the system band-
width B is divided intoR Resource Blocks (RBs), withB = R ·BRB. A RB represents one basic time-frequency
unit that occupies the bandwidthBRB over timeT . The considered scenario consists in two types of coexisting
networks i.e., eNB and HeNB transmitter-receiver couples.We considerM eNBs systems andF = N HeNBs
systems. We refer to the eNB transmitter witheNBm and we represent thef ∈ F HeNB asHeNBf , f = 1, . . . , N .
Associated with each eNB and HeNB areUM macro andUF femto users, respectively. The multi-user resource
assignment that distributes theR RBs among theUM macro andUF femto users, is carried out by a proportional
fair scheduler. We denote bypn = (pn1 , . . . , p
n
R) the transmission power vector of BSn, with p
n
r denoting the















r ≤ P Fmax.
We analyze the system performance in terms of Signal to NoiseRatio (SNR) and achieved data rate given in
(bit/s). Assuming perfect synchronization in time and frequ ncy, the SNR of user associated toHeNBf who is











PATH LOSS MODELS FOR URBAN DEPLOYMENT.
eNB to macrouser outdoors PL(dB) = 15.3 + 37.6 log10 d
HeNB to
femtouser PL(dB) = 38.46 + 20 log10 d + 0.7dindoor + w ∗ WP in
macro/femto user
macrouser PL(dB) = max(15.3 + 37.6 log10 d, 38.46 + 20 log10 d) + 0.7dindoor + w ∗ WP in + WPout
whereσ2 denotes the thermal noise power andhmr represents the channel link betweeneNB andu
m, um∈UM . We
represent the channel link betweenHeNBf anduf , uf∈UF , throughh
f
r and the interferant link betweenHeNBf




































We consider the system parameters and Path Loss (PL) models as proposed in [7] by 3GPP for both, HeNB and
eNB systems. We model the link channels as presented in TableI.
III. W EAKLY COUPLED CONSTRAINED GAMES
In this section we introduce the concept of existence, uniqueness and selection of equilibrium for non-cooperative
concaven-players games with coupled constraints. Then, we apply this theory to find the power allocation strategy
in a HeNB.
N -person games are defined byn players, where each playeri ∈ n has its own set of pure strategiesSi and
a utility function U i, which maps then-tuple of pure strategies, one per player in the game, into a real number.
Non-cooperative games are given by the incapacity of players in the game to share information, cooperate or share
utilities. The existence of at least one equilibrium point in finite non-cooperativen-person games without or with
orthogonal constraints was proven by Nash in [3]. Going a step further, the existence of equilibrium in games with
coupled constraints i.e., when the choice of strategies of aplayer depends on the strategies chosen by other agents
was extended by Arrow and Debreu in [8].
The uniqueness of equilibrium point for non-cooperativen-person strictly concave games was proven by Rosen
in [6] through the normalized equilibrium concept. More in detail, Rosen considers problems where every players
joint strategy, which is a point in the product space of the individual strategy spaces, lie in convex, closed and
bounded regionR in the product space and that each player’s utility functionU i is a concave function in his own
strategy [6]. To apply the normalized equilibrium concept,the game must fulfill an additional concavity condition,
which is called diagonal strict concavity.
As mentioned in the introduction of this work, the problem weaim to solve perfectly fits in the coupled constrained
non-cooperativen-person game approach. We considerN non-cooperative players, i.e., theN HeNBs in the system,





r the N − 1 vector formed by all players’ strategies butf . Let S ⊂ Rn be a
compact convex set.
Each player in the game has a utility function,Uf : Rnf → R. An equilibrium in this game consists of a vector
p∗r ∈ R such that for each playerf , U
f (pfr ) attains its maximum over allp
f




r[−f ]) ∈ R. Here,R
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is a convex compact set of constraints and(pfr , p
−f∗
r ) is the policy obtained fromp∗r by the strategies of all players,
except for that playerf who usespfr instead ofp∗r. The maximization problem is then given by:
maximize Uf (pfr , p
−f
r ) subject to p
f
r ∈ p
f (p−fr ) (2)
In our problem, we consider the case where theN HeNBs transmit in downlink direction to their associated
users. We consider the setting in which the achievable utility of all HeNBs is given by the convex regionν defined







0 ≤ pfr ≤ PFmax
whereITh is an interference constraint at macrouserum. Every playerf maximizes its own utilityUf , which is
assumed to be a strictly concave increasing function of its strategy vectorpf . Given the system model presented in
Section II, we assume that the utility of a player depends only its own strategy. We call such games WCCGs,
where the interaction with other players occurs only through the constraints. This a special case of normalized
Nash equilibrium [6], where interactions between players are given by both,the utility function and the constraints.
The interference constraintITh at macrousers is a common constraint that all players strategies are required to
satisfy, therefore, this places this game in the category ofcoupled constraints defined by Rosen [6]. In games with
coupled constraints the choice of strategies of a player depends on the strategies chosen by other players.
The equilibrium notion of the given game is a special case of the so-called GNEP [4], where multiple players





i, j ∈ pf , for which (pfrj, p
−f
r ) ∈ ν. When games with constraints are defined, it is not enough to consider the
utility and constraints of each player, it is also required to specify how a player evaluates the fact that constraints of
another player are satisfied or violated. We focus on studying the properties of the normalized equilibria introduced
by Rosen in [6], since its properties are quiet appropriate for decentralized implementations.






r = ITh (3)
are Nash equilibria and Pareto-efficient. Any other point isnot an equilibrium.
Remark 1: The strategy of playerf in our game consists of choosing the i-th entry of the transmission power
vector pf . A deviation off from a point in the achievable utility regionν to another one in that region affects
only its own utility and not the other players one.
A. Normalized Nash Equilibrium
As mentioned before we propose that players choose the WCCG equilibrium, which is a special case of normalized
Nash equilibrium, among the large number of Nash equilibriums. Normalized Nash equilibriums are based on
pricing, which means that players’ action will have a price based on the constraints defining the game. We are
interested in pricing mechanisms that induce equilibria str tegies and that can be implemented in a scalar and
decentralized way. We denote byλf the transmitted power price of HeNBf based on the total interference atum































If the solution forLfλ(p
f∗
r ) exists, it can be viewed as the Lagrangian solution corresponding to the constrained
optimization problem faced by playerf when the other players playp−f∗r . Based on the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
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conditions we know that there exists a vectorλ, whose entries are not necessarily equal, such that a power vectorp∗r











the non-scalable pricing, whereλf represents the price per transmitted power of playerf . λ is non-scalable since
the price depends onf .





λf∇gf (p∗r) = 0 (6)
for λf ≥ 0. Here,gf represents the constraint function. We denote the solutionasp∗r(λ).
Problem 1: Consider a constantλ and letλ be a vector of dimensionN with all its entriesλ. Then, we want
to find λ such thatp∗r(λ) is an equilibrium of the original game.
An equilibrium associated with some constraintλ that solvesProblem 1 is a special case of the normalized
equilibrium concept presented in [6].
Theorem 1: There exists a unique normalized equilibrium to the original problem associated with someλ as
defined inProblem 1 as long as there exist a strategy that satisfy the constraints.
Proof: Define G to be theN -dimensional square matrix whoseGij entry is
∂Lf (x)2
∂xi∂xj
. All the off diagonal
elements are zero since we assumed that the utility of a player do s not depend on the actions of other players.
The N remaining diagonal elements ofG + GT are strictly negative definite due to our assumption that theutility
of playerf is strictly concave in the strategies of playerf . We conclude thatG + GT is strictly negative deffinite.
The Proof then follows from [6, Theorem 6].
In our particular case we know that there exists at least oneN -dimensional vectorpr, with all its elements
p
f
r = 0, which would satisfies the coupled constraint.
B. HeNB interference management game
We also assume that players in this game can have different strictly concave utility functions satisfying the given
restriction. In what follows we present the considered utility functions regarding throughput and performance.
1) Physical layer Shannon throughput:
Uf = B · log2(1 + γ
f
r ) (7)
2) Physical layer BER. OFDMA systems use Quadrature Phase-shift Keying (QPSK), 16 Quadrature Amplitude
Modulation (QAM) and 64 QAM modulations. We propose to use a tight BER approximation for squared
M -QAM for Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channels and ideal coherent phase detection [9] given
by:






Then, the utility functions given any of the following modulations are:
• QPSK











































Packet delay (const. size S)
Packet delay (M/M/1)
Fig. 2. HeNBs Utilities functions.










• Assuming an M/M/1 queuing system, where files have an exponentially distributed size with rateη and
files arrive according to Poisson process with arrival rateρ, the packet delay is given byD = 1
η−ρ
, then
the utility function is:
Uf = −
1
B · log2(1 + γ
f
r ) − ρ
(12)
In Figure 2 the above introduced utility functions are represented. Notice that the aim of this figure is only to
show the different functions behavior in order to demonstrate their strictly concave behavior.
IV. SOLUTION
In what follows we present the solution of equation (6) considering the different proposed utility functions. The



























































































































































The packet delay utility function (11) is highly complex to slve. We shall therefore restrict utility to low SNR
regime, which means that the approximationln(1 + x) ≃ x holds. This regime is of interest since HeNBs are low-
power cellular BSs. Specifically, for the packet delay utility function for files with constant size given in equation









































For the packet delay utility function for the case of files with exponentially distributed size and Poisson arrival

























































In the present work we have modeled a multi HeNB scenario in coexistence with a eNB system as a non-
cooperativen-person game. Given the common nature of the interference ateNB users restriction in the game,
we proposed a special form GNEP equilibrium concept for coupled constraint games, the WCCG. We found the
normalized equilibrium among the infinitely many equilibriums of the given coupled game in a closed form for
multiple concave utility functions that HeNBs can choose depending on the parameter they aim to maximize i.e.,
throughput, BER, packet delay.
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